The Russo-Ukraine War is a vital learning opportunity for military strategists across the globe. The first and clearest lesson to be gleaned from it is this: the soundness of a military's strategy and the nimbleness with which it can adapt to unforeseen circumstances are the two most important factors in deciding victory or defeat. The War for Ukraine analyzes the war through these twin lenses of strategy and adaptation, detailing how each army has succeeded or failed to plan for and adapt to this twenty-first century war.
Author Mick Ryan examines the foundations of Ukrainian and Russian strategy for their ongoing war, looking back over several decades to reveal how both sides have evolved their military strategy and force structure. Each has undertaken institutional-level reforms of their military and national security enterprises in the decade leading up to this war. But because the emergent behavior of military forces after fighting begins cannot be fully predicted, these prewar reforms only constitute a starting point for adaptation during the war. Part I of the book covers the role of strategic leadership, with a focus on evolution of strategy since February 2022. From there, the second part of the book delves into how the Ukrainians and Russians have adapted their tactics, organizations, operational approaches, and strategic foundations for war-making throughout the conflict.
Central to this discussion are the ways that, regardless of cutting-edge technology, human elements have remained a crucial deciding factor in Ukraine. Ryan shows how good leadership allows a nation to navigate the ambiguity and uncertainty of conflict, while poor leadership leaves it vulnerable to surprises. Likewise, The War for Ukraine offers case studies of the importance of an institution's ability to nurture and reward human learning as it relates to combat. The book provides strategists, policymakers, and military leaders with a basis from which to plan for constant adaption in military organizations. General readers of contemporary global conflict will also find The War for Ukraine of great interest.
USS Intrepid's Fighting Squadron 18 (VF-18) was one of the U.S. Navy's highest-scoring carrier units of World War II. Despite having only one combat veteran in its roster, its aviators--including Cecil Speedball Harris, the Navy's second-ranking ace--were credited with shooting down more than 170 planes during their 81-day tour of duty, earning the squadron the nickname Two-a-Day 18 in newspapers nationwide. How did a novice unit with a comparatively short time in theater accomplish such a feat?
To answer this question, Intrepid's Fighting Squadron 18 follows squadron members through training, into combat, and finally to the end of their harrowing stories--whether they took the return trip home or made the ultimate sacrifice. Drawing extensively on archival and family collections, author Mike Fink reveals the personalities of these men and the binding friendships they built. Moe Mollenhauer, Fighting 18's youngest pilot, had a score to settle with the Japanese. Outspoken Punchy Mallory incredibly was reprimanded for shooting down enemy planes. And the squadron's best-known figure, Cecil Speedball Harris, took the lead in preparing his peers for war before they took their place at the tip of the Navy's spear. Intrepid's Fighting Squadron 18 is as much about the bonds these young men formed as it is about Pacific War history.
The men of Fighting 18 joined the Navy's massive fast-carrier force in August 1944--just in time to participate in the last great air and sea battles in the Pacific. They were one of the first squadrons to engage Japan's massive battleship force during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, racked up incredible scores and suffered devastating losses during the Formosa Air Battle, and bore witness to an unthinkable new weapon--the kamikaze suicide attack--as the war entered its desperate endgame. Ultimately, Intrepid's Fighting Squadron 18 showcases the powerful impact of war on those who fight it and sheds light on the impact of those men on the war itself.
In The Admiral's Bookshelf--the third and final title in the Bookshelf series--Adm. James Stavridis, a leader in international business, national security, and global philanthropy, shares the books that facilitated his success. A guide to living and leading through reading, The Admiral's Bookshelf links twenty-five essential life lessons and leadership principles to the books that best illustrate them. Each chapter covers a single work of literature and showcases Stavridis' deft analysis of its significance and impact, as well as what he learned and how he used it to better himself. The result is a rewarding and compelling volume that shows how anyone can use expansive reading to develop essential skills and values for successful leadership.
Stavridis' eclectic collection covers both fiction and nonfiction, ranging from explicitly instructive works to philosophy, history, biography, and memoir. It features classics such as Sun Tzu's The Art of War alongside lesser-known writings. The wisdom he gleans from these books and their parallels to his own life is often surprising and deeply resonant. He shows how Don Vito Corleone's success in The Godfather results from the same skills and priorities that benefited the Department of Defense under Donald Rumsfeld, how The Handmaid's Tale teaches one to think independently, and how leaders can learn patience from The Odyssey.
The life of Admiral Stavridis, as he reveals it to readers book by book, chapter by chapter, and lesson by lesson, makes a compelling case for the importance of reading to acquire practical life skills and to enrich one's character. Stavridis offers sound advice on what and how to read, how to build an extensive personal library, and how to become wiser, savvier, and more resilient in positions of responsibility. Anyone seeking to become a better leader--or a better reader--will find The Admiral's Bookshelf an invaluable guide.
After reviewing the principle catalysts of change in the security environment, War Transformed seeks to provide a preview of the shape of war and competition in the twenty-first century. Ryan examines both the shifting character of war and its enduring nature. In doing so, he proposes important trends in warfare that will shape all aspects of human competition and conflict in the coming decades.
The remainder of the book analyzes how military institutions must prepare for future competition and conflict. Competing and engaging in combat in this new era involves new and evolved strategies and warfighting concepts, as well as adapting our current military organizations. It will also demand building an intellectual edge in military personnel through evolved concepts of training, education, and development. As the competitive environment and potential battlefields continue to change, conceptions of combat, competition and conflict must also evolve. Mick Ryan makes the case for transforming how Western military institutions view war in this century.
One of the most difficult security challenges of the post-Cold War era has been stabilizing failing states in an era of irregular warfare. A consistent component of the strategy to address this problem has been security force assistance where outside powers train and advise the host nation's military.
Despite billions of dollars spent, the commitment of thousands of advisors, and innumerable casualties, the American efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq failed catastrophically. Nevertheless, among those colossal military disasters were pockets of success. The Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) held back the Islamic State in 2014 long enough to allow American and allied forces to flow back into the country, and many Afghan commando units fought to the bitter end as their country disintegrated around them.
What made those units successful while the larger missions ended disastrously? Author Frank K. Sobchak explores security force assistance across five case studies, examining what factors were most critical for U.S. Special Forces units to build capable partners like the ISOF and the commandos. More specifically, the book assesses the impact of five components of Special Forces advisory missions: language training and cultural awareness of the advising force; the partner force-to-advisor ratio; the advisors' ability to organize host-nation forces; whether advisors are permitted to guide in combat; and the consistency in advisor pairing.
Based on the experiences of U.S. Army Special Forces in El Salvador (1981-1991), Colombia (2002-2016), the Philippines (2001-2015), Iraq (2003-2011), and Afghanistan (2007-2021), Sobchak argues that the most crucial factors in producing combat-effective partners are consistency in advisor pairing and maintaining a partner force-to-advisor ratio of twelve special forces soldiers advising a company-sized force or smaller. Intriguingly, and counter to conventional wisdom, at first glance language training and cultural awareness do not seem to be critical factors, as most of the Green Berets that trained units in Iraq and Afghanistan lacked both capabilities. Despite an orthodoxy that argues the opposite, there is little evidence that combat advising is decisive in producing effective partners and there is conflicting evidence that language training and cultural awareness are important. Many of these findings, while focused on Special Forces operations and doctrine, could be used to improve the odds of success for larger security-force assistance missions as well.
How have navies contemplated possible enemies? How did they learn, or fail to learn, once operations began? How does this analysis inform today's planning for future conflict? These questions guide the noted historians and naval strategists who contributed to Planning for War at Sea. A central theme is the regular failure of navies' best-laid plans.
Covering four centuries of naval warfare, the chapters illustrate the challenges all navies faced when considering possible enemies. Even during the Age of Sail, ships were among the most expensive and long-term national endeavors. Navies therefore planned well in advance for future wars, usually without knowing their adversaries or how they would fight them at sea. Building a capable navy requires sustained investment in naval infrastructure long before the fighting starts.
In the final chapters naval strategists expand on this historical analysis to address how effectively or ineffectively today's three leading navies--Russia, China, and the United States--have configured themselves during the post-Cold War era in preparing for future great power conflict. This collection is an important work for strategists, scholars, and policymakers.