When confronted with a persistent foreign policy problem that threatens U.S. interests, and that cannot be adequately addressed through economic or political pressure, American policymakers and opinion formers have increasingly resorted to recommending the use of limited military force: that is, enough force to attempt to resolve the problem while minimizing U.S. military deaths, local civilian casualties, and collateral damage.

These recommendations have ranged from the bizarre--such as a Predator missile strike to kill Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, or the assassination of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez--to the unwise--the preemptive bombing of North Korean ballistic missile sites--to the demonstrably practical--air raids into Bosnia and Somalia, and drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan.

However, even though they have been a regular feature of America's uses of military force through four successive administrations, the efficacy of these Discrete Military Operations (DMOs) remains largely unanalyzed, leaving unanswered the important question of whether or not they have succeeded in achieving their intended military and political objectives.

In response, Micah Zenko examines the thirty-six DMOs undertaken by the US over the past 20 years, in order to discern why they were used, if they achieved their objectives, and what determined their success or failure. In the process, he both evaluates U.S. policy choices and recommends ways in which limited military force can be better used in the future. The insights and recommendations made by Zenko will be increasingly relevant to making decisions and predictions about the development of American grand strategy and future military policy.

Essential reading for business leaders and policymakers, an in-depth investigation of red teaming, the practice of inhabiting the perspective of potential competitors to gain a strategic advantage

Red teaming. The concept is as old as the Devil's Advocate, the eleventh-century Vatican official charged with discrediting candidates for sainthood. Today, red teams are used widely in both the public and the private sector by those seeking to better understand the interests, intentions, and capabilities of institutional rivals. In the right circumstances, red teams can yield impressive results, giving businesses an edge over their competition, poking holes in vital intelligence estimates, and troubleshooting dangerous military missions long before boots are on the ground. But not all red teams are created equal; indeed, some cause more damage than they prevent. Drawing on a fascinating range of case studies, Red Team shows not only how to create and empower red teams, but also what to do with the information they produce.

In this vivid, deeply-informed account, national security expert Micah Zenko provides the definitive book on this important strategy -- full of vital insights for decision makers of all kinds.

In 2009, presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev pledged to sign a bilateral treaty to limit the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia to approximately 1,500 deployed nuclear weapons and 750 delivery systems. While this represents a significant reduction from cold war?era levels, the two countries still retain more than 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons. As good-faith progress toward President Obama's stated commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, both countries need to begin negotiating a follow-up bilateral treaty to reduce their respective arsenals.

Micah Zenko offers specific recommendations for U.S. policy on four strategic and technical issues that such a treaty would raise:

- Beginning high-level discussions with U.S. allies on the tradeoffs between extended deterrence and deeper nuclear cuts

- Promoting the joint U.S.-Russia development of missile defense radar and interceptors

- Proposing transparency and confidence-building measures for deployed U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear weapons

- Developing a framework to account for deploying advanced conventional weapons on nuclear-capable delivery systems.

At a time of global nuclear uncertainty, this report defines a path to greater security and commitment to a nonnuclear world.

When confronted with a persistent foreign policy problem that threatens U.S. interests, and that cannot be adequately addressed through economic or political pressure, American policymakers and opinion formers have increasingly resorted to recommending the use of limited military force: that is, enough force to attempt to resolve the problem while minimizing U.S. military deaths, local civilian casualties, and collateral damage. These recommendations have ranged from the bizarre--such as a Predator missile strike to kill Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, or the assassination of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez--to the unwise--the preemptive bombing of North Korean ballistic missile sites--to the demonstrably practical--air raids into Bosnia and Somalia, and drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan. However, even though they have been a regular feature of America's uses of military force through four successive administrations, the efficacy of these Discrete Military Operations (DMOs) remains largely unanalyzed, leaving unanswered the important question of whether or not they have succeeded in achieving their intended military and political objectives. In response, Micah Zenko examines the thirty-six DMOs undertaken by the US over the past 20 years, in order to discern why they were used, if they achieved their objectives, and what determined their success or failure. In the process, he both evaluates U.S. policy choices and recommends ways in which limited military force can be better used in the future. The insights and recommendations made by Zenko will be increasingly relevant to making decisions and predictions about the development of American grand strategy and future military policy.