Managing foreign policy crises has become a recurring challenge for U.S. presidents. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been one hundred twenty occasions in which a threatening development overseas triggered a period of intense, high-level deliberation about what the United States should do in response (see the list of U.S. foreign policy crises from 1989 to 2019). This equates to an average of fifteen crises for each four-year presidential term. Although the stakes varied from crisis to crisis, each required the president to decide--usually in pressured circumstances and with considerable uncertainty about the risks involved--whether the situation warranted sending military forces in harm's way to protect U.S. interests. On more than forty occasions, the president determined that it did. While most of these crises were eventually resolved with little or no lasting impact on U.S. interests, some festered and became more difficult and costly to address at a later date.

It is unlikely that foreign policy crises will become any less frequent or vexing for future U.S. presidents. By most appraisals, the world is entering a more turbulent and crisis-prone era. Recent actions by the United States, particularly by the Donald J. Trump administration, have contributed to this turbulence as well as to the perception that the United States may no longer be as committed to playing an active role in some regions. Such uncertainty could encourage some states and actors to test the United States' resolve; others, hedging against U.S. disengagement, could adopt policies that are inadvertently destabilizing.

Virtually every U.S. administration--certainly those in recent years--has aspired to be more proactive about managing foreign policy crises. Despite the best of intentions, however, U.S. policymakers continue to be surprised by threatening developments overseas, reacting in a belated and ad hoc fashion. This track record does not suggest that similar efforts in the future could produce better results. It is vital, therefore, that the United States devote more attention and resources to preventing potential crises from arising and being better prepared to manage them when they do. For the last ten years, the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations has closely studied how to accomplish this task. This report represents a distillation of CPA's findings and recommendations.

North Korea poses difficult challenges for the United States. The full extent of the North Korean nuclear arsenal is unknown; tens of thousands of U.S. forces are deployed on the Korean peninsula in support of U.S. commitments to South Korea; and the peninsula sits in a strategically vital region, where the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea all have important interests at stake. And the Kim Jong-Il government is perhaps the world's most difficult to read or even see.

Preparing for Sudden Change in North Korea focuses on how to manage one of the most central unknowns: the prospect of change in North Korea's leadership. Paul B. Stares and Joel S. Wit outline three scenarios of succession --managed, contested, and failed --and offer policy recommendations for dealing with potentially fractious leadership change. Stares and Wit consider the challenges that these scenarios would pose to domestic institutions and regional security, the proliferation of nuclear arms, jumpstarting the economy, and providing humanitarian assistance.

This book, first published in 1985, analyses the factors that have shaped the militarization of space. By examining in great detail the determinants of U.S. policy, it explains why for over 25 years space did not become the scene of an arms race, and why this began to change in the late 1970s. Both superpowers did, however, develop a limited anti-satellite capability in the 1960s, and these programmes are also discussed.

This book, first published in 1985, analyses the factors that have shaped the militarization of space. By examining in great detail the determinants of U.S. policy, it explains why for over 25 years space did not become the scene of an arms race, and why this began to change in the late 1970s. Both superpowers did, however, develop a limited anti-satellite capability in the 1960s, and these programmes are also discussed.

The United States can ill afford additional overseas military commitments to manage the consequences of regional instability. Yet it must make a concerted effort to harness and enhance the efforts of international actors to reduce the risk of violent conflict and prevent new crises from arising.

Enhancing International Preventive Action acknowledges the UN efforts, international financial institutions, regional organizations, and informal multilateral groupings that are making important contributions to the prevention of violent conflict in areas crucial to U.S. interests. Much more should be done, however, to shape and support the work of these actors. Through their assessment of the advantages and shortcomings of the principal international actors, Paul B. Stares and Micah Zenko recommend ways that the United States can help develop a more effective global architecture for preventive action.

This report builds on an earlier study, Enhancing U.S. Preventive Action, that proposed concrete ways to improve the existing U.S. preventive framework. It precedes a third report that will examine the role of private sector actors.

The market for illicit drugs is expanding inexorably around the world. More kinds of drugs are becoming more available in more places than ever before. But the drug trade is not only growing, it is changing in character. It has ceased to be a marginal area of criminal activity and has now become a major global enterprise controlled by formidable interests that threaten much more than the health of drug users. Moreover, the immense wealth that has been amassed from selling drugs has given the principal trafficking organizations enormous power to corrupt and intimidate public officials and government institutions.

In this major book, Paul Stares presents a compelling portrait of the global drug market and the consequences of this international plague. He explains that there are good reasons to fear that the global market for drugs will continue to expand in the coming years: profits to the traffickers are huge; the revolutionary advances in communications, transportation, and information technology facilitate smuggling, as do the lowering of border controls and trade tariffs and the trends toward privatization and deregulation. Meanwhile, the expanded volume of global trade, travel, and financial transactions makes it harder for customs and police authorities to detect and stop illicit activities. Added to the growing incentives and opportunities to supply illicit drugs, the level of demand is increasing in many new areas of the world, particularly in formerly communist countries and many areas of the developing world.

What can done about this growing problem? One option is legalization, but Stares contends that its implementation would be problematic while its benefits remain unclear. Yet, continuing on the present course will not work either. Stares argues that reducing both the supply and demand for illicit drugs requires a fundamental shift away from the current overwhelming emphasis on negative sanctions to deter and deny their production, trafficking, and consumption. Instead, he calls for more positive control measures that primarily rely on persuasion and cooperation. He advocates the creation of a global drug monitoring and evaluation network, a global drug use prevention program, a global drug treatment training program, and an international drug crisis response program.

According to Stares, the effectiveness of reorienting drug control policy to curb the global habit will ultimately depend on the international community's willingness to address much larger concerns to which the drug problem is inextricably linked-- including overpopulation, environmental degradation, poverty, illiteracy, ethnic strife, and disease. Only by recognizing the fundamental relationship between these larger issues and the global drug problem can meaningful progress be made. Selected by Choice as an Outstanding Book for 1996

Since the first heroic and largely spontaneous acts precipitated the end of the Cold War, Europe has been transformed in a truly remarkable and wholly unforeseen manner: Germany has been unified, the Warsaw Pact has collapsed, and the Soviet Union has disintegrated, leaving in its wake many new independent states.

These momentous events have taken place so rapidly and often in such confused circumstances that their full meaning has barely been comprehended let alone assimilated. A clearer and deeper appreciation of the forces and processes unleashed by the recent changes is vitally important, however, to meet the challenges and exploit the opportunities that now present themselves in Europe. This volume, therefore, is intended to promote wider understanding of the key issues, and it represents the most comprehensive assessment to date of the new Germany and the new Europe.

The volume begins with detailed accounts by U.S. and German scholars of how unification came about and the resulting changes to the political economy, security policy, and foreign relations. A complementary section discusses the implications for the rest of Europe as well as Japan. While the focus of the book is on the new Germany, two separate chapters provide specific designs for a new adoption of a general system of cooperative security.

The United States can ill afford the burden of additional foreign policy challenges. This makes it imperative that the U.S. government find ways to identify, delay, and avert international crises that could harm U.S. interests or even lead to military engagement. The Obama administration has repeatedly affirmed its support for working to prevent future international crises, but it has offered few new solutions in its first months in office.

Enhancing U.S. Preventive Action provides an actionable road map for how the U.S. government should revamp its existing prevention architecture to make it more effective in dealing with potential crises abroad. Paul B. Stares and Micah Zenko analyze the shortcomings of the prevention capacities within the U.S. government. They provide concrete recommendations for creating new interagency coordinating mechanisms within the National Security Council, improving the delivery of useful and timely early warning mechanisms to policymakers, and strengthening the unique institutional capabilities within the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department.

The market for illicit drugs is expanding inexorably around the world. More kinds of drugs are becoming more available in more places than ever before. But the drug trade is not only growing, it is changing in character. It has ceased to be a marginal area of criminal activity and has now become a major global enterprise controlled by formidable interests that threaten much more than the health of drug users. Moreover, the immense wealth that has been amassed from selling drugs has given the principal trafficking organizations enormous power to corrupt and intimidate public officials and government institutions.

In this major book, Paul Stares presents a compelling portrait of the global drug market and the consequences of this international plague. He explains that there are good reasons to fear that the global market for drugs will continue to expand in the coming years: profits to the traffickers are huge; the revolutionary advances in communications, transportation, and information technology facilitate smuggling, as do the lowering of border controls and trade tariffs and the trends toward privatization and deregulation. Meanwhile, the expanded volume of global trade, travel, and financial transactions makes it harder for customs and police authorities to detect and stop illicit activities. Added to the growing incentives and opportunities to supply illicit drugs, the level of demand is increasing in many new areas of the world, particularly in formerly communist countries and many areas of the developing world.

What can done about this growing problem? One option is legalization, but Stares contends that its implementation would be problematic while its benefits remain unclear. Yet, continuing on the present course will not work either. Stares argues that reducing both the supply and demand for illicit drugs requires a fundamental shift away from the current overwhelming emphasis on negative sanctions to deter and deny their production, trafficking, and consumption. Instead, he calls for more positive control measures that primarily rely on persuasion and cooperation. He advocates the creation of a global drug monitoring and evaluation network, a global drug use prevention program, a global drug treatment training program, and an international drug crisis response program.

According to Stares, the effectiveness of reorienting drug control policy to curb the global habit will ultimately depend on the international community's willingness to address much larger concerns to which the drug problem is inextricably linked-- including overpopulation, environmental degradation, poverty, illiteracy, ethnic strife, and disease. Only by recognizing the fundamental relationship between these larger issues and the global drug problem can meaningful progress be made. Selected by Choice as an Outstanding Book for 1996