Like its predecessor, this book overturns the conventional wisdom using a treasure trove of new sources, many of them from the North Vietnamese side. Rejecting the standard depiction of U.S. military intervention as a hopeless folly, it shows America's war to have been a strategic necessity that could have ended victoriously had President Lyndon Johnson heeded the advice of his generals. In light of Johnson's refusal to use American ground forces beyond South Vietnam, General William Westmoreland employed the best military strategy available. Once the White House loosened the restraints on Operation Rolling Thunder, American bombing inflicted far greater damage on the North Vietnamese supply system than has been previously understood, and it came close to starving North Vietnam into submission.
American military operations enabled the South Vietnamese government to recover from the massive instability that followed the assassination of President Neo Dinh Diem, while American culture sustained public support for the war through the end of 1968, giving South Vietnam realistic hopes for long-term survival. America's defense of South Vietnam averted the imminent fall of key Asian nations to Communism and sowed strife inside the Communist camp, to the long-term detriment of America's great-power rivals, China and the Soviet Union.
A national security expert makes the case for a dramatically different approach to counterinsurgency.
It is rare to read a book which combines academic excellence with such timely advice on a question of national importance. Mark Moyar has achieved this in his penetrating examination of leadership. . . . His perceptive analysis will have enduring value on both sides of the Atlantic for military commanders, policy-makers and historians alike.--General Sir David Richards, Chief of the General Staff, RUSI Journal
[This] brilliant young scholar of the Vietnam War reminds us that it takes a special kind of soldier--reflective, patient, creative--to lead counterinsurgency operations.--Eliot A. Cohen, Washington Post
An insightful revisionist look at counterinsurgency . . . essential reading for students of military history and anyone interested in what can be learned from the current fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.--Library Journal