In Three Dangerous Men, defense expert Seth Jones argues that the US is woefully unprepared for the future of global competition. While America has focused on building fighter jets, missiles, and conventional warfighting capabilities, its three principal rivals--Russia, Iran, and China--have increasingly adopted irregular warfare: cyber attacks, the use of proxy forces, propaganda, espionage, and disinformation to undermine American power.

Jones profiles three pioneers of irregular warfare in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran who adapted American techniques and made huge gains without waging traditional warfare: Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov; the deceased Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani; and vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia. Each has spent his career studying American power and devised techniques to avoid a conventional or nuclear war with the US. Gerasimov helped oversee a resurgence of Russian irregular warfare, which included attempts to undermine the 2016 and 2020 US presidential elections and the SolarWinds cyber attack. Soleimani was so effective in expanding Iranian power in the Middle East that Washington targeted him for assassination. Zhang Youxia presents the most alarming challenge because China has more power and potential at its disposal.

Drawing on interviews with dozens of US military, diplomatic, and intelligence officials, as well as hundreds of documents translated from Russian, Farsi, and Mandarin, Jones shows how America's rivals have bloodied its reputation and seized territory worldwide. Instead of standing up to autocratic regimes, Jones demonstrates that the United States has largely abandoned the kind of information, special operations, intelligence, and economic and diplomatic action that helped win the Cold War.

In a powerful conclusion, Jones details the key steps the United States must take to alter how it thinks about--and engages in--competition before it is too late.

After the swift defeat of the Taliban in 2001, American optimism has steadily evaporated in the face of mounting violence; a new war of a thousand cuts has now brought the country to its knees. In the Graveyard of Empires is a political history of Afghanistan in the Age of Terror from 2001 to 2009, exploring the fundamental tragedy of America's longest war since Vietnam.

After a brief survey of the great empires in Afghanistan--the campaigns of Alexander the Great, the British in the era of Kipling, and the late Soviet Union--Seth G. Jones examines the central question of our own war: how did an insurgency develop? Following the September 11 attacks, the United States successfully overthrew the Taliban regime. It established security throughout the country--killing, capturing, or scattering most of al Qa'ida's senior operatives--and Afghanistan finally began to emerge from more than two decades of struggle and conflict. But Jones argues that as early as 2001 planning for the Iraq War siphoned off resources and talented personnel, undermining the gains that had been made. After eight years, he says, the United States has managed to push al Qa'ida's headquarters about one hundred miles across the border into Pakistan, the distance from New York to Philadelphia.

While observing the tense and often adversarial relationship between NATO allies in the Coalition, Jones--who has distinguished himself at RAND and was recently named by Esquire as one of the Best and Brightest young policy experts--introduces us to key figures on both sides of the war. Harnessing important new research and integrating thousands of declassified government documents, Jones then analyzes the insurgency from a historical and structural point of view, showing how a rising drug trade, poor security forces, and pervasive corruption undermined the Karzai government, while Americans abandoned a successful strategy, failed to provide the necessary support, and allowed a growing sanctuary for insurgents in Pakistan to catalyze the Taliban resurgence.

Examining what has worked thus far--and what has not--this serious and important book underscores the challenges we face in stabilizing the country and explains where we went wrong and what we must do if the United States is to avoid the disastrous fate that has befallen many of the great world powers to enter the region.

In Three Dangerous Men, defense expert Seth Jones argues that the US is woefully unprepared for the future of global competition. While America has focused on building fighter jets, missiles, and conventional warfighting capabilities, its three principal rivals--Russia, Iran, and China--have increasingly adopted irregular warfare: cyber attacks, the use of proxy forces, propaganda, espionage, and disinformation to undermine American power.

Jones profiles three pioneers of irregular warfare in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran who adapted American techniques and made huge gains without waging traditional warfare: Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov; the deceased Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani; and vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia. Each has spent his career studying American power and devised techniques to avoid a conventional or nuclear war with the US. Gerasimov helped oversee a resurgence of Russian irregular warfare, which included attempts to undermine the 2016 and 2020 US presidential elections and the SolarWinds cyber attack. Soleimani was so effective in expanding Iranian power in the Middle East that Washington targeted him for assassination. Zhang Youxia presents the most alarming challenge because China has more power and potential at its disposal.

Drawing on interviews with dozens of US military, diplomatic, and intelligence officials, as well as hundreds of documents translated from Russian, Farsi, and Mandarin, Jones shows how America's rivals have bloodied its reputation and seized territory worldwide. Instead of standing up to autocratic regimes, Jones demonstrates that the United States has largely abandoned the kind of information, special operations, intelligence, and economic and diplomatic action that helped win the Cold War.

In a powerful conclusion, Jones details the key steps the United States must take to alter how it thinks about--and engages in--competition before it is too late.

This report examines Russia's growing use of private military companies (PMCs) to increase its influence through irregular means. In recent years, Moscow has expanded its overseas use of PMCs to countries such as Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Madagascar, and Mozambique. Many of the PMCs operating in these countries, such as the Wagner Group, frequently cooperate with the Russian government--including the Kremlin, Ministry of Defense (particularly the Main Intelligence Directorate, or GRU), Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and Federal Security Service (FSB)--and perform a variety of combat, paramilitary, security, and intelligence tasks. However, many of these PMCs have a poor track record--including operational failures and human rights abuses--and there are opportunities to exploit PMC vulnerabilities. Although Russian PMCs present only one of a variety of national security threats and challenges facing the United States, this report assesses that they warrant a more substantive and coordinated response from the United States and its partners.

This report analyzes the U.S. and allied campaign against the al Qa'ida-linked terrorist group al Shabaab in Somalia, examines what steps have been most successful against the group, and identifies potential recommendations. It concludes that, while al Shabaab was weakened between 2011 and 2016, the group could resurge if urgent steps are not taken to address the political, economic, and governance challenges at the heart of the conflict.

In 1981, the Soviet-backed Polish government declared martial law to crush a budding democratic opposition movement. Moscow and Washington were on a collision course. It was the most significant crisis of Ronald Reagan's fledgling presidency. Reagan authorized a covert CIA operation codenamed QRHELPFUL to support dissident groups, particularly the trade union Solidarity. The CIA provided money that helped Solidarity print newspapers, broadcast radio programs, and conduct an information campaign against the government.

This gripping narrative reveals the little-known history of one of America's most successful covert operations through its most important characters--spymaster Bill Casey, CIA officer Richard Malzahn, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa, Pope John Paul II, and the Polish patriots who were instrumental to the success of the program. Based on in- depth interviews and recently declassified evidence, A Covert Action celebrates a decisive victory over tyranny for US intelligence behind the Iron Curtain, one that prefigured the Soviet collapse.

One of the most striking developments in recent international politics has been the significant increase in security cooperation among European Union states. Seth Jones argues that this increase in cooperation, in areas such as economic sanctions, weapons production and collaboration among military forces, has occurred because of the changing structure of the international and regional systems. Since the end of the Cold War, the international system has shifted from a bipolar to a unipolar structure characterized by United States dominance. This has caused EU states to cooperate in the security realm to increase their ability to project power abroad and to decrease reliance on the US. Furthermore, European leaders in the early 1990s adopted a 'binding' strategy to ensure long-term peace on the continent, suggesting that security cooperation is caused by a desire to preserve peace in Europe whilst building power abroad.

China is conducting an unprecedented campaign below the threshold of armed conflict to expand the influence of the Chinese Communist Party and weaken the United States and its partners. The scale of China's actions in the United States is unparalleled. This CSIS report offers one of the most comprehensive analyses to date of Chinese political warfare activities and examines China's main actions, primary goals, and options for the United States and its partners.

This CSIS report asks two main questions. How is the Russian military thinking about the future of warfare? How is the Russian military thinking about force design over the next five years? The report has several findings. First, Russian military thinking is dominated by a view that the United States is--and will remain--Moscow's main enemy (главный враг) for the foreseeable future. This sentiment will likely drive Moscow's desire to reconstitute its military as rapidly as possible, as well as strengthen nuclear and conventional deterrence. Second, Russian analyses generally conclude that while the nature of warfare is unchanging, the character of future warfare will rapidly evolve. Adapting will require Russia's cooperation with other countries, such as China, in areas like long-range, high-precision weapons; unmanned systems; emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence; and the utility of hybrid and irregular warfare. Third, Russian political and military leaders are committed to a major reconstitution of the Russian military--including the army--over the next several years.

China's defense industrial base is operating on a wartime footing, while the U.S. defense industrial base is largely operating on a peacetime footing. Overall, the U.S. defense industrial ecosystem lacks the capacity, responsiveness, flexibility, and surge capability to meet the U.S. military's production and warfighting needs. Unless there are urgent changes, the United States risks weakening deterrence and undermining its wartime capabilities. China is heavily investing in munitions and acquiring high-end weapons systems and equipment five to six times faster than the United States. China is also the world's largest shipbuilder and has a shipbuilding capacity that is roughly 230 times larger than the United States. One of China's large shipyards, such as Jiangnan Shipyard, has more capacity than all U.S. shipyards combined.

Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine triggered the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II and raised significant questions about the United States' role in Europe. This CSIS report examines the U.S. force posture in Europe---including the military capabilities, personnel, infrastructure, and agreements that support defense operations and plans---and makes recommendations for future U.S. posture. It finds that the United States needs a robust, long-term military force posture in Europe, focused on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) eastern flank, to deter future Russian aggression.

There are growing calls for a decrease in the U.S. military presence in the Middle East. This CSIS report assesses three posture options for U.S. forces in the region to inform the debate over the United States' military presence in the Middle East. The report finds that the United States should keep a notable but tailored presence in the Middle East to contain the further expansion of Chinese and Russian military power and to check the actions of Iran and terrorist organizations that threaten the United States and its allies and partners.

Unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) have played an important role in warfare over the past two decades, including to conduct counterterrorism operations. To better understand the utility of UASs, this latest report from CSIS adopts a comparative case study approach and examines the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, Ukraine war in 2022, and Northern Edge-21 exercise in the Indo-Pacific in 2021. These cases demonstrate that UASs have been increasingly integrated into combined arms warfare, a major change from the past. In addition, UASs are likely to play an increasingly important role in several types of missions as part of strategic competition and warfare with such countries as China and Russia.

The U.S. defense industrial base is not adequately prepared for the international security environment that now exists. In a major regional conflict--such as a war with China in the Taiwan Strait--the U.S. use of munitions would likely exceed the current stockpiles of the U.S. Department of Defense. According to the results of a series of CSIS war games, the United States would likely run out of some munitions--such as long-range, precision-guided munitions--in less than one week in a Taiwan Strait conflict. The war in Ukraine has also exposed serious deficiencies in the U.S. defense industrial base and serves as a stark reminder that a protracted conflict is likely to be an industrial war that requires a defense industry able to manufacture enough munitions, weapons systems, and matériel to replace depleted stockpiles.

As timelines for a possible conflict in Asia shrink, the goal should be to support the production capacity required to enable the United States and its allies and partners to deter and, if deterrence fails, fight and win at least one major theater war--if not two. Just in time and lean manufacturing operations must be balanced with carrying added capacity. The U.S. Department of Defense, in coordination with Congress, should develop a plan now that involves taking steps to streamline and improve production, acquisitions, replenishment, Foreign Military Sales, ITAR, and other policies and procedures. A revitalization of the defense industrial base will not happen overnight for the United States or its allies and partners. It is time to prepare for the era of competition that now exists.

One of the most striking developments in recent international politics has been the significant increase in security cooperation among European Union states. Seth Jones argues that this increase in cooperation, in areas such as economic sanctions, weapons production and collaboration among military forces, has occurred because of the changing structure of the international and regional systems. Since the end of the Cold War, the international system has shifted from a bipolar to a unipolar structure characterized by United States dominance. This has caused EU states to cooperate in the security realm to increase their ability to project power abroad and to decrease reliance on the US. Furthermore, European leaders in the early 1990s adopted a 'binding' strategy to ensure long-term peace on the continent, suggesting that security cooperation is caused by a desire to preserve peace in Europe whilst building power abroad.

Examines nation-building efforts in such countries as Iraq and Afghanistan, and assesses the success of U.S. and allied efforts in reconstructing internal security institutions.

This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. It argues that successful counterinsurgency requires effective indigenous security forces, especially police; a viable and legitimate local government; and

Pakistan has undertaken a number of operations against militant groups since 2001. There have been some successes, but such groups as al Qa1ida continue to present a significant threat to Pakistan, the United States, and other countries. Pakistan needs to establish a population-centric counterinsurgency that better protects the local population and addresses grievances. It also needs to abandon militancy as a tool of foreign and domestic policy.

In Afghanistan, local communities have played a critical role in security, especially in rural areas. Afghan national security forces are important to the top-down strategy, but the Afghan government and NATO forces also need to leverage local communities to gain a complementary bottom-up strategy. This analysis discusses the viability of establishing local security forces in Afghanistan and addresses concerns about the wisdom of such policies.