Great cases are those judicial decisions around which the common law develops. This book explores eight exemplary cases from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia that show the law as a living, breathing, and down-the-street experience. It explores the social circumstances in which the cases arose and the ordinary people whose stories influenced and shaped the law as well as the characters and institutions (lawyers, judges, and courts) that did much of the heavy lifting. By examining the consequences and fallout of these decisions, the book depicts the common law as an experimental, dynamic, messy, productive, tantalizing, and bottom-up process, thereby revealing the diverse and uncoordinated attempts by the courts to adapt the law to changing conditions and shifting demands. Great cases are one way to glimpse the workings of the common law as an untidy, but stimulating exercise in human judgment and social accomplishment.

More has been said about the Hart-Fuller debate than can be considered healthy or productive even within the precious world of jurisprudential scholarship - too much philosophising about how law has revelled in its own abstractness and narrowness. But the mission of this book is distinctly and determinedly different - it is not to rework these already-rehashed ideas, but to reject them entirely.

Rather than add to the massive jurisprudential literature that has been generated by all and sundry, the book criticises and abandons the project that Hart and Fuller set in motion. It contends that the turn that was taken in 1957 has led down a series of cul-de-sacs, blind alleys, and dead-ends to nowhere useful or illuminating. It is more than past time to leave their debate behind and strike out in an entirely new and more promising direction. The book insists that not only law, but also all theorising about law, is political in all its derivations, dimensions, and directions.

Shortlisted for the 2000 Walter Owen Book Prize (first edition)
The importance of ethical behaviour and professional responsibility has long been something lawyers have insisted is a hallmark of their chosen profession. However, many lawyers would argue that a discussion of these matters is necessary only when considering isolated and occasional cases of aberrant behaviour. In Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Allan Hutchinson makes a convincing case that this view no longer serves the profession well. He argues that the profound changes in the way in which law is practised, and the demographic shifts among those who practise it, demand a new and systematic approach to the subject--one that stresses personal responsibility over professional regulation. Professor Hutchinson's book is both an accessible introduction to legal ethics and professional responsibility for students of law and a provocative call to arms for the profession as a whole. The second edition of the book contains significant discussion and analysis of the Canadian Bar Association's new Code of Professional Conduct, which was adopted in 2006.

Great cases are those judicial decisions around which the common law develops. This book explores eight exemplary cases from the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia that show the law as a living, breathing, and down-the-street experience. It explores the social circumstances in which the cases arose and the ordinary people whose stories influenced and shaped the law as well as the characters and institutions (lawyers, judges, and courts) that did much of the heavy lifting. By examining the consequences and fallout of these decisions, the book depicts the common law as an experimental, dynamic, messy, productive, tantalizing, and bottom-up process, thereby revealing the diverse and uncoordinated attempts by the courts to adapt the law to changing conditions and shifting demands. Great cases are one way to glimpse the workings of the common law as an untidy, but stimulating exercise in human judgment and social accomplishment.

Any effort to understand how law works has to take seriously its main players - judges. Like any performance, judging should be evaluated by reference to those who are its best exponents. Not surprisingly, the debate about what makes a 'great judge' is as heated and inconclusive as the debate about the purpose and nature of law itself. History shows that those who are generally considered to be candidates for a judicial hall of fame are game changers who oblige us to rethink what it is to be a good judge. So the best of judges must tread a thin line between modesty and hubris; they must be neither mere umpires nor demigods. The eight judges showcased in this book demonstrate that, if the test of good judging is not about getting it right, but doing it well, then the measure of great judging is about setting new standards for what counts as judging well.

This book offers a radical challenge to all existing accounts of the common law's development. Contrary to received jurisprudential wisdom, it maintains there is no grand theory which will explain satisfactorily the dynamic interactions of change and stability in the common law's history. Offering fresh and original readings of Charles Darwin's and Hans-Georg Gadamer's works, the book demonstrates that law is a rhetorical activity that can only be properly appreciated in its historical and political context. It reveals that, like life, law is an organic process and that common law is a perpetual work-in-progress.

'Great cases' are those judicial decisions around which the common law pivots. In a sequel to the instant classic Is Eating People Wrong?, this book presents eight new great cases from the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia. Written in a highly accessible yet rigorous style, it explores the social circumstances, institutions (lawyers, judges and courts) and ordinary people whose stories shaped the law. Across the courts' diverse and uncoordinated attempts to adapt to changing conditions and shifting demands, it shows the law as the living, breathing and down-the-street experience it really is. Including seminal cases in end of life, abortion and equal rights, this is an ideal introduction for students to legal history and jurisprudence.

Toward an Informal Account of Legal Interpretation offers a viable account of law, judicial decision-making, and legal interpretation that is as fresh as it is familiar. The author expertly challenges the dominant mode of formalist theorizing and proposes an explanatory account of legal interpretation that can profitably be understood as an 'informal' intervention. Such an informal approach has no truck with either the claims of the formalists (i.e., that law is something separate from ideology) or those of the anti-formalists (i.e., that law is nothing other than ideological posturing). Hutchinson insists that, when understood properly, legal interpretation is an applied exercise in law-and-ideology; it is both constrained and unconstrained in equal measure. In developing this informalist account through a sustained application of the 'no vehicles in the park' rule, this book is wide-ranging in theoretical scope and substance, but also accessible and practical in style.

As things stand, a commitment to weak democracy and strong constitutionalism ensures that a range of elite groups, actors, and institutions - political, economic, intellectual, and legal - hold considerable sway over constitutional matters, leaving less room for the participation of ordinary people. With the continued primacy of liberal constitutionalism, constitutional law has come to represent and facilitate the centrality of judicial power and authority. In Democracy and Constitutions, Allan C. Hutchinson warns against this deference to a legal elite on questions of constitutional meaning. For Hutchinson, an over-reliance on constitutional law, and a lack of attention to democratic politics, keeps people from influencing the moral and political character of society; it saps civic energies and relegates ordinary people to the sidelines.

Engaging and provocative, Democracy and Constitutions charts a course away from the elitism of the present and toward a more democratic future, one that re-balances society's commitment to both democracy and constitutions. Advocating for a strong democracy and weak constitutionalism, this book places ordinary people at the institutional heart of government and politics, arguing that such a re-calibration is better for democracy and for society.

As things stand, a commitment to weak democracy and strong constitutionalism ensures that a range of elite groups, actors, and institutions - political, economic, intellectual, and legal - hold considerable sway over constitutional matters, leaving less room for the participation of ordinary people. With the continued primacy of liberal constitutionalism, constitutional law has come to represent and facilitate the centrality of judicial power and authority. In Democracy and Constitutions, Allan C. Hutchinson warns against this deference to a legal elite on questions of constitutional meaning. For Hutchinson, an over-reliance on constitutional law, and a lack of attention to democratic politics, keeps people from influencing the moral and political character of society; it saps civic energies and relegates ordinary people to the sidelines.

Engaging and provocative, Democracy and Constitutions charts a course away from the elitism of the present and toward a more democratic future, one that re-balances society's commitment to both democracy and constitutions. Advocating for a strong democracy and weak constitutionalism, this book places ordinary people at the institutional heart of government and politics, arguing that such a re-calibration is better for democracy and for society.

As a social process that places great stock in its stability and predictability, law does not deal easily or well with change. In a modern world that is in a constant and rapid state of flux, law is being placed under considerable stress in its efforts to fulfill its task as a primary regulator of social and economic behaviour. This challenge is particularly acute in the realm of technology and its profound ramifications for social and economic behaviour. The innovative Techno-Age not only offers fresh ways of handling old problems, but also throws up entirely new problems; traditional ways of thinking about and responding to these old and new problems and their optimal resolution are no longer as tenable as many once thought. One such example is the burgeoning world of cryptocurrencies - this peer-to-peer digital network presents a profound challenge to the status quo of the financial services sector, to the established modes of state-backed fiat currency, and to the regulatory authority and reach of law. Taken together, these related challenges demand the urgent attention of jurists, lawyers and law reformers. It is the future and relevance of legal regulation as much as cryptocurrency that is at stake. This book proposes an approach to regulating cryptocurrency that recognises and retains its innovative and transformative potential, but also identifies and deals with some of its less appealing qualities and implications.

At the end of June 1860, the great and good of Britain's intellectual establishment gathered in Oxford for the annual jamboree of the Association for the Advancement of Science. Only six months after the publication of Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species, the stage was set and the characters in place for the mother of all donnybrooks. But for all the posturing and opinionating about the nature of evolution, the exchanges held massive and broader implications for social authority and established control in a changing world. Although taking place over 150 years ago, the Oxford debate still inflames the same passions today and continues to set the defining terms for the struggle between science and religion. As such, this book is as much a pertinent contribution to today's cultural wars as it is a convincing historical record.

At the end of June 1860, the great and good of Britain's intellectual establishment gathered in Oxford for the annual jamboree of the Association for the Advancement of Science. Only six months after the publication of Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species, the stage was set and the characters in place for the mother of all donnybrooks. But for all the posturing and opinionating about the nature of evolution, the exchanges held massive and broader implications for social authority and established control in a changing world. Although taking place over 150 years ago, the Oxford debate still inflames the same passions today and continues to set the defining terms for the struggle between science and religion. As such, this book is as much a pertinent contribution to today's cultural wars as it is a convincing historical record.

More has been said about the Hart-Fuller debate than can be considered healthy or productive even within the precious world of jurisprudential scholarship - too much philosophising about how law has revelled in its own abstractness and narrowness. But the mission of this book is distinctly and determinedly different - it is not to rework these already-rehashed ideas, but to reject them entirely.

Rather than add to the massive jurisprudential literature that has been generated by all and sundry, the book criticises and abandons the project that Hart and Fuller set in motion. It contends that the turn that was taken in 1957 has led down a series of cul-de-sacs, blind alleys, and dead-ends to nowhere useful or illuminating. It is more than past time to leave their debate behind and strike out in an entirely new and more promising direction. The book insists that not only law, but also all theorising about law, is political in all its derivations, dimensions, and directions.

Law is best interpreted in the context of the traditions and cultures that have shaped its development, implementation, and acceptance. However, these can never be assessed truly objectively: individual interpreters of legal theory need to reflect on how their own experiences create the framework within which they understand legal concepts. Theory is not separate from practice, but one kind of practice. It is rooted in the world, even if it is not grounded by it. In this highly original volume, Allan C. Hutchinson takes up the challenge of self-reflection about how his upbringing, education, and scholarship contributed to his legal insights and analysis. Through this honest examination of key episodes in his own life and work, Hutchinson produces unique interpretations of fundamental legal concepts. This book is required reading for every lawyer or legal scholar who wants to analyse critically where he or she stands when they practice and study law.

Law is best interpreted in the context of the traditions and cultures that have shaped its development, implementation, and acceptance. However, these can never be assessed truly objectively: individual interpreters of legal theory need to reflect on how their own experiences create the framework within which they understand legal concepts. Theory is not separate from practice, but one kind of practice. It is rooted in the world, even if it is not grounded by it. In this highly original volume, Allan C. Hutchinson takes up the challenge of self-reflection about how his upbringing, education, and scholarship contributed to his legal insights and analysis. Through this honest examination of key episodes in his own life and work, Hutchinson produces unique interpretations of fundamental legal concepts. This book is required reading for every lawyer or legal scholar who wants to analyse critically where he or she stands when they practice and study law.

'Great cases' are those judicial decisions around which the common law pivots. In a sequel to the instant classic Is Eating People Wrong?, this book presents eight new great cases from the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia. Written in a highly accessible yet rigorous style, it explores the social circumstances, institutions (lawyers, judges and courts) and ordinary people whose stories shaped the law. Across the courts' diverse and uncoordinated attempts to adapt to changing conditions and shifting demands, it shows the law as the living, breathing and down-the-street experience it really is. Including seminal cases in end of life, abortion and equal rights, this is an ideal introduction for students to legal history and jurisprudence.

Toward an Informal Account of Legal Interpretation offers a viable account of law, judicial decision-making, and legal interpretation that is as fresh as it is familiar. The author expertly challenges the dominant mode of formalist theorizing and proposes an explanatory account of legal interpretation that can profitably be understood as an 'informal' intervention. Such an informal approach has no truck with either the claims of the formalists (i.e., that law is something separate from ideology) or those of the anti-formalists (i.e., that law is nothing other than ideological posturing). Hutchinson insists that, when understood properly, legal interpretation is an applied exercise in law-and-ideology; it is both constrained and unconstrained in equal measure. In developing this informalist account through a sustained application of the 'no vehicles in the park' rule, this book is wide-ranging in theoretical scope and substance, but also accessible and practical in style.

This book offers a radical challenge to all existing accounts of the common law's development. Contrary to received jurisprudential wisdom, it maintains there is no grand theory which will explain satisfactorily the dynamic interactions of change and stability in the common law's history. Offering fresh and original readings of Charles Darwin's and Hans-Georg Gadamer's works, the book demonstrates that law is a rhetorical activity that can only be properly appreciated in its historical and political context. It reveals that, like life, law is an organic process and that common law is a perpetual work-in-progress.

Three questions concerning modern legal thought provide the framework for It's All in the Game: What should judges do? What do judges do? What can judges do? Contrasting his own answers to traditional responses and moving playfully between debates of high theory, daily practices of appellate judges, and his own enlightening analyses of significant court rulings, Allan C. Hutchinson examines what it means to treat adjudication as an engaged game of rhetorical justification. His resulting argument enables the reader to grasp more fully the practical operation, political determinants, and the transformative possibilities of law and adjudication.
Taking on leading contemporary theories to explore the claim that law is politics, Hutchinson delineates a route toward professional, relevant, and responsible--if radical--judicial practices. After discussing the difference between foundationalist, antifoundationalist, and nonfoundationalist legal critiques, he offers a focused, unequivocal, and positive account of the advantages of operating within a nonfoundationalist framework. Although such an approach centralizes the role of rhetoric in law, Hutchinson claims that this does not necessitate a turn away from politics or, more particularly, from a progressive politics. Driving home the political and jurisprudential impact of his critique and of his account of nonfoundationalist alternatives, he urges judges and jurists to engage in law's language game of politics.
This engaging book will interest linguistic philosophers, legal theorists, law students, attorneys, judges, and jurists of all stripes.