Five hundred years of Western hegemony has ended, while the global majority's aspiration for a world order based on multipolarity and sovereign equality is rising. This incisive book addresses the demise of liberal hegemony, though pointing out that a multipolar Westphalian world order has not yet taken shape, leaving the world in a period of interregnum. A legal vacuum has emerged, in which the conflicting sides are competing to define the future order.

NATO expansionism was an important component of liberal hegemony as it was intended to cement the collective hegemony of the West as the foundation for a liberal democratic peace. Instead, it dismantled the pan-European security architecture and set Europe on the path to war without the possibility of a course correction. Ukraine as a divided country in a divided Europe has been a crucial pawn in the great power competition between NATO and Russia for the past three decades.

The war in Ukraine is a symptom of the collapsing world order. The war revealed the dysfunction of liberal hegemony in terms of both power and legitimacy, and it sparked a proxy war between the West and Russia instead of ensuring peace, the source of its legitimacy.
The proxy war, unprecedented sanctions, and efforts to isolate Russia in the wider world contributed to the demise of liberal hegemony as opposed to its revival. Much of the world responded to the war by intensifying their transition to a Eurasian world order that rejects hegemony and liberal universalism. The economic architecture is being reorganised as the world diversifies away from excessive reliance on Western technologies, industries, transportation corridors, banks, payment systems, insurance systems, and currencies. Universalism based on Western values is replaced by civilisational distinctiveness, sovereign inequality is swapped with sovereign equality, socialising inferiors is replaced by negotiations, and the rules-based international order is discarded in favour of international law. A Westphalian world order is reasserting itself, although with Eurasian characteristics.

The West's defeat of Russia would restore the unipolar world order while a Russian victory would cement a multipolar one. The international system is now at its most dangerous as the prospect of compromise is absent, meaning the winner will take all. Both NATO under US direction and Russia are therefore prepared to take great risks and escalate, making nuclear wan increasingly likely.

How do think tanks influence Western policies toward Russia? The influence of think tanks in Washington has grown immensely over the past decades in terms of producing research papers, engaging with the media, and having their staff enter government.

The ideal purpose and appeal of think tanks is their ability to function as a bridge between academics, the media, the public, and decision-makers. Political decision-makers are expected to be experts across a wide area of governance which becomes increasingly difficult as the world becomes more complex. Acquiring advice and enhancing competencies through cooperation with scholars at universities can be challenging as academics tend to focus on narrow research questions that take place within a wider discussion of theory and method. Think tanks respond to this challenge as institutions that provide focused research studies and policy papers to address specific and current challenges.

The negative aspect of think tanks is the power they wield, from controlling information to functioning as a waiting room for politicians out of office. Information is power, and a think tanks business model has been established that sells political influence in Washington and manufactures consent among the public. The military-industrial complex is the dominant donor to think tanks, which results in a bias toward military solutions and perpetuating conflict.

Russia remains a leading adversary of the West and has sustained Washington's exorbitant military spending over many decades. Think tanks accordingly have a great incentive to push for a confrontational posture towards Russia as they operate in an industry where conflicts are profitable and peace produces losses A mutually acceptable post-Cold War settlement threatened the revenue of one of the largest and most influential industries in the US, which was reversed as a result of NATO expansion and renewed tensions with Russia.

This book explores how the think tanks function, and how their growing role has influenced US policies toward Russia.

This book examines how the EU as a geoeconomic region will be impacted by the Russian-Chinese cooperation to construct a Greater Eurasia.

An analysis of Russian conservatism from the 19th century to contemporary Russia.

This book defines Russophobia as the irrational fear of Russia, a key theme in the study of propaganda in the West as Russia has throughout history been assigned a diametrically opposite identity as the Other. Propaganda is the science of convincing an audience without appealing to reason. The West and Russia have been juxtaposed as Western versus Eastern, European versus Asiatic, civilized versus barbaric, modern versus backward, liberal versus autocratic, and even good versus evil. During the Cold War, ideological dividing lines fell naturally by casting the debate as capitalism versus communism, democracy versus totalitarianism, and Christianity versus atheism. After the Cold War, anti-Russian propaganda aims to filter all political questions through the simplistic binary stereotype of democracy versus authoritarianism, which provides little if any heuristic value to understand the complexities of relations. A key feature of propaganda against the inferior Other is both contemptuous derision and panic-stricken fear of the threat to civilization. Russia has therefore throughout history been allowed to play one of two roles--either an apprentice of Western civilization by accepting the subordinate role as the student and political object, or a threat that must be contained or defeated. While propaganda has the positive effect of promoting unity and mobilizing resources toward rational and strategic objectives, it can also have the negative effect of creating irrational decision-making and obstructing a workable peace.

This book defines Eurasianism, a political idea with a long tradition, for a new century. Historically, Eurasia was depicted as a third continent with a geographical and historical space distinctively different from both Europe and Asia. Today, the concept is mobilized by the Russian foreign policy elite to imagine a close relationship with China and indirectly inspires the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. A Russian-Chinese partnership forms the core of a new Eurasian region, yet Turkey, India, Hungary, Central Asia and the other parts of the supercontinent are also embracing Eurasian concepts. This book is of interest to scholars of Russian and Chinese foreign policy, to economists, and to scholars of political thought.

Do the EU and NATO threaten Russian security? The book explores the rise of these exclusive 'inter-democratic' security institutions after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the ensuing effects on relations with Russia. Two competing theories are tested to explore whether these institutions aggravate or mitigate the security dilemma with Russia. These institutions can be theorised to promote security as a positive-sum game through European integration and democracy promotion, or pursue collective hegemony with ideologically uncompromising bloc-politics. Glenn Diesen argues that a European security architecture that demotes the largest state on the continent to an object of security inevitably results in 'European integration' becoming a zero-sum geopolitical project that has set the West on a collision course with Russia.

Moscow has progressively replaced geopolitics with geoeconomics as power is recognised to derive from the state's ability to establish a privileged position in strategic markets and transportation corridors. The objective is to bridge the vast Eurasian continent to reposition Russia from the periphery of Europe and Asia to the centre of a new constellation. Moscow's 'Greater Europe' ambition of the previous decades produced a failed Western-centric foreign policy culminating in excessive dependence on the West. Instead of constructing Gorbachev's 'Common European Home', the 'leaning-to-one-side' approach deprived Russia of the market value and leverage needed to negotiate a more favourable and inclusive Europe. Eurasian integration offers Russia the opportunity to address this 'overreliance' on the West by using the Russia's position as a Eurasian state to advance its influence in Europe.

Offering an account steeped in Russian economic statecraft and power politics, this book offers a rare glimpse into the dominant narratives of Russian strategic culture. It explains how the country's outlook adjusts to the ongoing realignment towards Asia while engaging in a parallel assessment of Russia's interactions with other significant actors. The author offers discussion both on Russian responses and adaptations to the current power transition and the ways in which the economic initiatives promoted by Moscow in its project for a 'Greater Eurasia' reflect the entrepreneurial foreign policy strategy of the country.

What explains the rise of populist movements across the West and their affinity towards Russia? UKIP's Brexit victory, Trump's triumph, and the successive elections and referendums in Europe were united by a repudiation of the liberal international order. These new political forces envision the struggle to reproduce and advance Western civilisation to be fought along a patriotism-cosmopolitanism or nationalism-globalism battlefield, in which Russia becomes a partner rather than an adversary. Armed with neomodernism and geoeconomics, Russia has inadvertently taken on a central role in the decay of Western civilisation.

This book explores the cooperation and competition between Western and Russian civilisation and the rise of anti-establishment political forces both contesting the international liberal order and expressing the desire for closer relations with Russia. Diesen proposes that Western civilisation has reached a critical juncture as modern society (gesellschaft) has overwhelmed and exhausted the traditional community (gemeinschaft) and shows the causes for the decay of Western civilisation and the subsequent impact on cooperation and conflict with Russia. The author also considers whether Russia's international conservativism is authentic and can negate the West's decadence, or if it is merely a shrewd strategy by a rival civilisation also in decay.

This volume will be of interest to scholars of international relations, political science, security studies, international political economy, and Russian studies.

Why and how will the fourth industrial revolution impact great power politics? Here, Glenn Diesen utilizes a neoclassical, global approach to great power politics to assess how far the development of AI, national and localized technological ecosystems and cyber-warfare will affect great power politics in the next century. The reliance of modern economies on technological advances, Diesen argues, also compels states to intervene radically in economics and the lives of citizens, as automation radically alters the economies of tomorrow.

This book defines Eurasianism, a political idea with a long tradition, for a new century. Historically, Eurasia was depicted as a third continent with a geographical and historical space distinctively different from both Europe and Asia. Today, the concept is mobilized by the Russian foreign policy elite to imagine a close relationship with China and indirectly inspires the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. A Russian-Chinese partnership forms the core of a new Eurasian region, yet Turkey, India, Hungary, Central Asia and the other parts of the supercontinent are also embracing Eurasian concepts. This book is of interest to scholars of Russian and Chinese foreign policy, to economists, and to scholars of political thought.

Provides an analysis of the development of Conservatism from the nineteenth century to contemporary Russia.

This book examines how the EU as a geoeconomic region will be impacted by the Russian-Chinese cooperation to construct a Greater Eurasia.

This book explores Russia's efforts towards both adapting to and shaping a world in transformation. Russia has been largely marginalized in the post-Cold War era and has struggled to find its place in the world, which means that the chaotic changes in the world present Russia with both threats and opportunities. The rapid shift in the international distribution of power and emergence of a multipolar world disrupts the existing order, although it also enables Russia to diversify it partnerships and restore balance. Adapting to these changes involves restructuring its economy and evolving the foreign policy. The crises in liberalism, environmental degradation, and challenge to state sovereignty undermine political and economic stability while also widening Russia's room for diplomatic maneuvering. This book analyzes how Russia interprets these developments and its ability to implement the appropriate responses.

Do the EU and NATO threaten Russian security? The book explores the rise of these exclusive 'inter-democratic' security institutions after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the ensuing effects on relations with Russia. Two competing theories are tested to explore whether these institutions aggravate or mitigate the security dilemma with Russia. These institutions can be theorised to promote security as a positive-sum game through European integration and democracy promotion, or pursue collective hegemony with ideologically uncompromising bloc-politics. Glenn Diesen argues that a European security architecture that demotes the largest state on the continent to an object of security inevitably results in 'European integration' becoming a zero-sum geopolitical project that has set the West on a collision course with Russia.

Moscow has progressively replaced geopolitics with geoeconomics as power is recognised to derive from the state's ability to establish a privileged position in strategic markets and transportation corridors. The objective is to bridge the vast Eurasian continent to reposition Russia from the periphery of Europe and Asia to the centre of a new constellation. Moscow's 'Greater Europe' ambition of the previous decades produced a failed Western-centric foreign policy culminating in excessive dependence on the West. Instead of constructing Gorbachev's 'Common European Home', the 'leaning-to-one-side' approach deprived Russia of the market value and leverage needed to negotiate a more favourable and inclusive Europe. Eurasian integration offers Russia the opportunity to address this 'overreliance' on the West by using the Russia's position as a Eurasian state to advance its influence in Europe.

Offering an account steeped in Russian economic statecraft and power politics, this book offers a rare glimpse into the dominant narratives of Russian strategic culture. It explains how the country's outlook adjusts to the ongoing realignment towards Asia while engaging in a parallel assessment of Russia's interactions with other significant actors. The author offers discussion both on Russian responses and adaptations to the current power transition and the ways in which the economic initiatives promoted by Moscow in its project for a 'Greater Eurasia' reflect the entrepreneurial foreign policy strategy of the country.

Why and how will the fourth industrial revolution impact great power politics? Here, Glenn Diesen utilizes a neoclassical approach to great power politics to assess how far the development of AI, national and localized technological ecosystems and cyber-warfare will affect great power politics in the next century. The reliance of modern economies on technological advances, Diesen argues, also compels states to intervene radically in economics and the lives of citizens, as automation radically alters the economies of tomorrow.

A groundbreaking attempt to contextualize the fourth industrial revolution, and analyse its effects on politics and international relations.

This book defines Russophobia as the irrational fear of Russia, a key theme in the study of propaganda in the West as Russia has throughout history been assigned a diametrically opposite identity as the Other. Propaganda is the science of convincing an audience without appealing to reason. The West and Russia have been juxtaposed as Western versus Eastern, European versus Asiatic, civilized versus barbaric, modern versus backward, liberal versus autocratic, and even good versus evil. During the Cold War, ideological dividing lines fell naturally by casting the debate as capitalism versus communism, democracy versus totalitarianism, and Christianity versus atheism. After the Cold War, anti-Russian propaganda aims to filter all political questions through the simplistic binary stereotype of democracy versus authoritarianism, which provides little if any heuristic value to understand the complexities of relations. A key feature of propaganda against the inferior Other is both contemptuous derision and panic-stricken fear of the threat to civilization. Russia has therefore throughout history been allowed to play one of two roles--either an apprentice of Western civilization by accepting the subordinate role as the student and political object, or a threat that must be contained or defeated. While propaganda has the positive effect of promoting unity and mobilizing resources toward rational and strategic objectives, it can also have the negative effect of creating irrational decision-making and obstructing a workable peace.

This book explores Russia's efforts towards both adapting to and shaping a world in transformation. Russia has been largely marginalized in the post-Cold War era and has struggled to find its place in the world, which means that the chaotic changes in the world present Russia with both threats and opportunities. The rapid shift in the international distribution of power and emergence of a multipolar world disrupts the existing order, although it also enables Russia to diversify it partnerships and restore balance. Adapting to these changes involves restructuring its economy and evolving the foreign policy. The crises in liberalism, environmental degradation, and challenge to state sovereignty undermine political and economic stability while also widening Russia's room for diplomatic maneuvering. This book analyzes how Russia interprets these developments and its ability to implement the appropriate responses.