Why did the stagflation of the 1970s--the improbable combination of high unemployment and runaway inflation--prove so painful and protracted? What explains the U.S. stock market's remarkable forty-year run of 12 percent average annual returns since then? Why is Japan still mired in a decades-long recession--and the Chinese economy in a tailspin? And what accounts for the resilience of U.S. stock and labor markets in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and in the face of the Fed's record interest rate hikes?

Donald H. Chew, Jr., argues that answers to these questions lie in the principles and methods of modern corporate finance. Ideas formulated and tested by finance scholars--notably, an efficient stock market in which prices reflect the long-run values of public companies and a market for corporate control that exerts continuous pressure on management--informed and spurred the investor-driven capitalism that has created the world's most productive and valuable companies. Drawing on his career-long relationships with leading academics and practitioners, Chew profiles key figures in the development of modern corporate finance while emphasizing their counterintuitive lessons for shareholders, companies, and countries. Corporate efficiency and value creation, he contends, are the fundamental source of the social wealth essential to addressing challenges such as poverty and climate change. Lively and provocative, this book makes corporate finance approachable--and even admirable--for readers interested in how the success and failure of companies affect their lives.

The past decade has given rise to a growing debate over the relative efficiency of different national economic systems. There are two basic corporate finance and governance systems that predominate in today's developed economies. One is the Anglo-American market based model, with widely dispersed shareholders and a fairly vigorous corporate control market. The other is the Japanese and German relationship based system, with its large bank and intercorporate holdings (and conspicuous absence of takeovers). Given the increasing globalization of business, which of these two systems can be expected to prevail over time? Or will the most valuable aspects of each be blended into a single new system? The story now being told by economists and management experts -- one that this book presents -- is a complicated one. Here is a sampling of the arguments:
Corporate strategist Michael Porter states that the U.S. system of allocating capital both within and across companies appears to be failing because of both capital market and internal pressures on U.S. companies to underinvest in the relatively intangible assets that contribute to corporate capabilities. In contrast to Porter, financial economist Michael Jensen maintains that the most formidable challenge now facing the U.S. economy -- and, indeed, the economies of all industrialized nations -- is the corporate overinvestment problem, a problem that was addressed in the U.S. by the leveraged restructuring of the 1980s. Nobel-Prize economist Merton Miller answers both Porters concern about U.S. underinvestment and Jensens pessimism about U.S. control systems with a classic defense of the shareholder-value principle. Corporate strategist C.K. Prahalad, unconvinced by the arguments of both Miller and Jensen, challenges the wisdom of corporate Americas commitment to maximizing shareholder value. In a roundtable discussion, Prahalad debates with shareholder value advocate Bennett Stewart about the effects of shareholder primacy in the U.S. and its absence in Japan.
Studies in International Corporate Finance and Governance Systems consists of 28 articles (and two roundtable discussions) written by academic and management experts in the fields of corporate finance and governance. Given its commitment to translating outstanding academic research into relatively plain English for practicing businessmen, this text should prove especially useful for corporate executives as well as students in MBA and executive development programs.

Corporate governance constitutes the internal and external institutions, markets, policies, and processes designed to help companies maximize their efficiency and value. In this collection of classic and current articles from the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, thought leaders such as Michael Jensen and Robert Monks discuss the corporate mission of value maximization and the accomplishments and limitations of the U.S. governance system in achieving that end.

Essays address the elements driving corporate value: the board of directors, compensation for CEOs and other employees, incentives and organizational structure, external ownership and control, role of markets, and financial reporting. They evaluate best practice methods, challenges in designing equity plans, transferable stock options, the controversy over executive compensation, the values of decentralization, identifying and attracting the right investors, the evolution of shareholder activism, creating value through mergers and acquisitions, and the benefits of just saying no to Wall Street's earnings game. Grounded in solid research and practice, U.S. Corporate Governance is a crucial companion for navigating the world of modern finance.

More than thirty leading scholars and finance practitioners discuss the theory and practice of using enterprise-risk management (ERM) to increase corporate values. ERM is the corporate-wide effort to manage the right-hand side of the balance sheet--a firm's total liability structure-in ways that enable management to make the most of the firm's assets. While typically working to stabilize cash flows, the primary aim of a well-designed risk management program is not to smooth corporate earnings, but to limit the possibility that surprise outcomes can threaten a company's ability to fund its major investments and carry out its strategic plan. Contributors summarize the development and use of risk management products and their practical applications. Case studies involve Merck, British Petroleum, the American airline industry, and United Grain Growers, and the conclusion addresses a variety of topics that include the pricing and use of certain derivative securities, hybrid debt, and catastrophe bonds.

Contributors: Tom Aabo (Aarhus School of Business); Alb ric Braas and Charles N. Bralver (Oliver, Wyman & Company); Keith C. Brown (University of Texas at Austin); David A. Carter (Oklahoma State University); Christopher L. Culp (University of Chicago); Neil A. Doherty (University of Pennsylvania); John R. S. Fraser (Hyrdo One, Inc.); Kenneth R. French (University of Chicago); Gerald D. Gay (Georgia State University); Jeremy Gold (Jeremy Gold Pensions); Scott E. Harrington (University of South Carolina); J. B. Heaton (Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott LLP); Joel Houston (University of Florida); Nick Hudson (Stern Stewart & Co.); Christopher James (University of Florida); A. John Kearney and Judy C. Lewent (Merck & Co., Inc.); Robert C. Merton and Lisa K. Meulbroek (Harvard Business School); Merton H. Miller (University of Chicago); Jouahn Nam (Pace University); Andrea M. P. Neves (CP Risk Management LLC); Brian W. Nocco (Nationwide Insurance); Andr F. Perold (Harvard Business School); S. Waite Rawls III (Continental Bank); Kenneth J. Risko (Willis Risk Solutions); Angelika Sch chlin (University of St. Gallen); Betty J. Simkins (Oklahoma State University); Donald J. Smith (Boston University); Clifford W. Smith Jr. (University of Rochester); Charles W. Smithson (Continental Bank); Ren M. Stulz (Ohio State University); D. S

All the articles that comprise this book were first published in the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance. Morgan Stanley's ownership of the journal is a reflection of its commitment to identifying outstanding academic research and promoting its application in the practicing corporate and investment communities.

Corporate governance constitutes the internal and external institutions, markets, policies, and processes designed to help companies maximize their efficiency and value. In this collection of classic and current articles from the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, thought leaders such as Michael Jensen and Robert Monks discuss the corporate mission of value maximization and the accomplishments and limitations of the U.S. governance system in achieving that end.

Essays address the elements driving corporate value: the board of directors, compensation for CEOs and other employees, incentives and organizational structure, external ownership and control, role of markets, and financial reporting. They evaluate best practice methods, challenges in designing equity plans, transferable stock options, the controversy over executive compensation, the values of decentralization, identifying and attracting the right investors, the evolution of shareholder activism, creating value through mergers and acquisitions, and the benefits of just saying no to Wall Street's earnings game. Grounded in solid research and practice, U.S. Corporate Governance is a crucial companion for navigating the world of modern finance.

Effective corporate governance, or the set of controls and incentives that drive top management, originates both outside and inside the firm and assures investors who hope to commit their capital. Essential when buying stocks in one's own country, effective corporate governance is even more important abroad, where information can be less reliable and investor influence (or protection) more limited.

In this collection of articles from the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, more than thirty leading scholars and practitioners discuss the possibilities and limitations of global corporate finance and governance systems, whether in Europe and North America or in the emerging markets of Israel, India, Korea, and South Africa. Essays discuss the political roots of American corporate finance; the structural and financial variations between international corporations; control premiums and the effectiveness of corporate governance systems; debt, folklore, and cross-country differences in financial structures; the driving forces behind the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997; corporate ownership and control in India, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom; financial and economic lessons of Italy's privatization program; changes in Korean corporate governance; sovereign wealth funds; and the new organization of Canadian business trusts. A special roundtable discussion addresses shareholder activism in the U.K.

Effective corporate governance, or the set of controls and incentives that drive top management, originates both outside and inside the firm and assures investors who hope to commit their capital. Essential when buying stocks in one's own country, effective corporate governance is even more important abroad, where information can be less reliable and investor influence (or protection) more limited.

In this collection of articles from the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, more than thirty leading scholars and practitioners discuss the possibilities and limitations of global corporate finance and governance systems, whether in Europe and North America or in the emerging markets of Israel, India, Korea, and South Africa. Essays discuss the political roots of American corporate finance; the structural and financial variations between international corporations; control premiums and the effectiveness of corporate governance systems; debt, folklore, and cross-country differences in financial structures; the driving forces behind the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997; corporate ownership and control in India, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom; financial and economic lessons of Italy's privatization program; changes in Korean corporate governance; sovereign wealth funds; and the new organization of Canadian business trusts. A special roundtable discussion addresses shareholder activism in the U.K.

More than thirty leading scholars and finance practitioners discuss the theory and practice of using enterprise-risk management (ERM) to increase corporate values. ERM is the corporate-wide effort to manage the right-hand side of the balance sheet--a firm's total liability structure-in ways that enable management to make the most of the firm's assets. While typically working to stabilize cash flows, the primary aim of a well-designed risk management program is not to smooth corporate earnings, but to limit the possibility that surprise outcomes can threaten a company's ability to fund its major investments and carry out its strategic plan. Contributors summarize the development and use of risk management products and their practical applications. Case studies involve Merck, British Petroleum, the American airline industry, and United Grain Growers, and the conclusion addresses a variety of topics that include the pricing and use of certain derivative securities, hybrid debt, and catastrophe bonds.

Contributors: Tom Aabo (Aarhus School of Business); Albéric Braas and Charles N. Bralver (Oliver, Wyman & Company); Keith C. Brown (University of Texas at Austin); David A. Carter (Oklahoma State University); Christopher L. Culp (University of Chicago); Neil A. Doherty (University of Pennsylvania); John R. S. Fraser (Hyrdo One, Inc.); Kenneth R. French (University of Chicago); Gerald D. Gay (Georgia State University); Jeremy Gold (Jeremy Gold Pensions); Scott E. Harrington (University of South Carolina); J. B. Heaton (Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott LLP); Joel Houston (University of Florida); Nick Hudson (Stern Stewart & Co.); Christopher James (University of Florida); A. John Kearney and Judy C. Lewent (Merck & Co., Inc.); Robert C. Merton and Lisa K. Meulbroek (Harvard Business School); Merton H. Miller (University of Chicago); Jouahn Nam (Pace University); Andrea M. P. Neves (CP Risk Management LLC); Brian W. Nocco (Nationwide Insurance); André F. Perold (Harvard Business School); S. Waite Rawls III (Continental Bank); Kenneth J. Risko (Willis Risk Solutions); Angelika Schöchlin (University of St. Gallen); Betty J. Simkins (Oklahoma State University); Donald J. Smith (Boston University); Clifford W. Smith Jr. (University of Rochester); Charles W. Smithson (Continental Bank); René M. Stulz (Ohio State University); D. S

All the articles that comprise this book were first published in the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance. Morgan Stanley's ownership of the journal is a reflection of its commitment to identifying outstanding academic research and promoting its application in the practicing corporate and investment communities.